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ABSTRACT 
The United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) engage in significant natural gas 
trade through the Internal Energy Market (IEM). As the UK exits from the EU however, it is 
likely to also exit from the IEM given the seemingly intractable positions of both parties. Exit 
of the UK from the IEM would likely cause an increase in natural gas trade costs between the 
two. The increased trade costs result from a number of channels including (1) loss in trade 
efficiency arising from loss of EU financing previously aimed at improving efficiencies in trade 
between the two; (2) loss in trade efficiency arising from loss in the sophistication of financial 
instruments that are linked to the UK’s membership of the EU and the IEM; (3) rising costs of 
doing business in the UK for many EU energy companies due to the effects of possible 
regulatory divergence between the UK and the EU; etc. We use a spatial equilibrium model to 
examine the trade flow, price and welfare implications of these cost effects on global natural 
gas trade, with a focus on the UK and the EU. We find that cost increases in the UK-EU natural 
gas trade links would result significant trade flow changes, with the UK and the EU reducing 
overall exports and increasing internal trade. As a result, there would be significant 
underutilisation of existing pipelines linking both parties. The Republic of Ireland would also 
form a significant number of new trade links to compensate for its reduction in imports from 
the UK. Total welfare losses in the UK and the EU are in the order of $479million and 
$602million respectively, which is equivalent to about 3.69% and 0.59% of the total value of 
natural gas trade for the respective parties in 2017. In the UK, the producer welfare loss is 
significantly higher, highlighting the vulnerability of the UK natural gas industry to cost 
increases in trade with the EU. 
Keywords: Brexit; Natural gas; Trade; Spatial equilibrium; Welfare 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Natural gas is a critical globally traded energy commodity. It is a significant source of primary 
energy and constitutes close to a quarter (i.e. 23.35%) of global primary energy consumption, 
with this share expected to rise over the coming decades (BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, 2017). In 2017, global natural gas consumption and production increased to the fastest 
rates since the immediate aftermath of the financial crises of the last decade. Natural gas is 
composed of methane (CH4) but can also have proportions of other gases such as ethane, 
propane, pentane and nitrogen. It is used as a fuel in space heating, transport, industrial 
processes and electricity generation among other purposes. Relative to coal and oil, natural gas 
is a cleaner source of fuel as it emits lower amounts of pollutants such as carbon dioxide (CO2), 
nitrogen oxide (NO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and particulates. With CO2 emissions for example, 
natural gas emits only 56.1 tCO2 per TJ while coal and oil emit 94.6 tCO2 per TJ and 73.3 tCO2 
per TJ respectively. Also, the geological conditions necessary for hosting natural gas are less 
severe than for example oil, making it a more abundant and widespread fuel source (Rogner, 
1989, Bhattacharyya, 2011). These factors partially explain the increasing preference for 
natural gas in primary energy consumption as the world transitions to cleaner energy in the 
wake of climate change concerns. 
The United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) engage in significant natural gas 
trade. On average, more than 99% of the UK’s annual natural gas exports are destined to the 
EU market whilst about 9.5% of all EU gas exports are destined to the UK (BP Statistical 
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Review of World Energy, 2017). Much of this trade is executed via natural gas pipelines and 
interconnectors, four of which link the UK and the European mainland via the North and Irish 
seas. Currently, trade in natural gas between the UK and the EU occurs under the rules of the 
Internal Energy Market (IEM), an institution established under Article 194 of the EU Treaty. 
The IEM aims to increase efficiency and promote competition in natural gas (and electricity) 
trade between EU member countries thereby reducing prices and costs, enhancing consumer 
and producer welfare, achieving greater market integration, etc. It is regulated by a complex 
system of rules and institutions that streamline and integrate the interface between EU national 
gas markets; and jointly optimises gas trade between them hence representing a first-best 
solution for trade. As an EU member country, the UK played a leading role in the design and 
function of the IEM. As it exits from the EU in 2019 however, there is significant likelihood 
that the UK would also exit from the IEM due to fundamentally divergent and incompatible 
differences in matters of principle between both parties. Specifically, the UK seeks to absolve 
itself of European trade rules which infringe on its post-Brexit sovereignty. On the other hand, 
the EU is a rules-based system and it is unlikely that it would allow the UK to fully participate 
and benefit from the IEM without compliance to its core trading rules.  
If the UK opts out of the IEM, there would be significant long-term efficiency losses in natural 
gas trade between the UK and the EU, resulting in potentially higher trading costs, lower trade 
volumes and higher prices (Fredriksson et al., 2017, The European Union Committee of the 
UK House of Lords, 2018). This may arise through a number of channels. First, as a member 
of the EU, the UK accesses substantial funding for capital-intensive but cost-reducing and 
efficiency-enhancing energy projects from the EU. Example EU institutions that provide this 
funding include the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Fund for Strategic 
Investment (EFSI) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Several of the projects funded 
by these EU institutions aim to enhance market integration between the UK and the EU. After 
Brexit and the UK’s potential withdrawal from the IEM, access to these funds may be limited 
or discontinued hence projects aiming to facilitate and integrate UK and EU gas markets may 
suffer. This would have long term higher cost effects for trade between both parties. Second, 
the sophistication of trading arrangements via contracts and financial instruments between the 
UK and EU gas markets may reduce. As a result, trade gains between both parties arising from 
these arrangements might diminish which may then manifest in higher trading costs. Third, the 
Republic of Ireland which is an EU member country imports a high share of its natural gas 
consumption from the UK. From an energy security perspective therefore, the EU through the 
Republic of Ireland is indirectly but significantly exposed to the UK in respect of its security 
of gas supply. This may have cost-increasing effects on trade between the UK and the EU via 
the Republic of Ireland.  
Fourth, many EU national gas and energy utility companies are significantly active in the UK. 
Exit of the UK from the IEM would expose these companies to regulatory risk as the UK and 
the EU choose potentially divergent future regulations, laws and policies for natural gas 
markets. This would lead to higher natural gas trading costs for these businesses, especially 
those businesses exposed to sourcing natural gas via the UK-EU trade links. Protectionist 
policies and laws may also be effected by the UK and the EU, which would exacerbate this 
cost-effect. Fifth, natural gas trade between the UK and the EU are currently tariff-free. 
However, tariffs may apply and possibly increase for supply of energy plant and materials trade 
between both parties thereby increasing the cost of trade between them. Finally, the UK’s exit 
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from the IEM may increase the risk of gas shortages for both parties during emergency and/or 
high demand periods. As the two parties are contemporaneously exposed to the same demand 
forces, trade may fall in high demand periods as both parties look to bolster natural gas supplies 
to meet own demand. An example such situation is during periods of extreme cold weather 
winters such as the 2009/10 and 2010/11 UK winters; or phenomena such as the ‘Beast from 
the East’ in 2018 which precipitated snow, high storms and plummeting temperatures thereby 
increasing gas demand significantly in the UK and parts of the EU. Bolstering own-supplies to 
enhance energy security in critical periods may have the effect of an implicit restriction on 
natural gas trade between the UK and the EU, leading to higher costs. 
We develop a Spatial Equilibrium (SE) model to quantify the likely trade flow, price and 
welfare effects of potential cost increases in natural gas trade between the UK and the EU, 
highlighting the risks and opportunities that this may represent for both parties as well as other 
countries in global natural gas trade. We find that cost increases in the UK-EU natural gas trade 
links would result significant trade flow changes, with the UK and the EU reducing overall 
exports and increasing internal trade. As a result, there would be significant underutilisation of 
existing pipelines linking both parties, and negative implications for the economic feasibility 
of planned future pipelines connecting the two. The Republic of Ireland would also form a 
significant number of new trade links to compensate for its reduction in imports from the UK. 
The new trade links would be based on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) trade rather than pipeline 
trade. The Republic of Ireland which hitherto had heavily depended on pipeline imports from 
the UK would therefore need to invest in new infrastructure (e.g. regasification facilities) to 
allow for the new trade in LNG. Total welfare losses in the UK and the EU are in the order of 
$479million and $602million respectively, which is equivalent to about 3.69% and 0.59% of 
the total value of natural gas trade for the respective parties in 2017. In the UK, the loss in 
producer surplus is significantly higher, highlighting the vulnerability of the UK natural gas 
industry to cost increases in trade with the EU. 
2 METHOD 
2.1 MODEL STRUCTURE 
We use a large-scale SE model to examine the trade flow, price and welfare effects of potential 
post-Brexit increases in natural gas trade costs between the UK and the EU. The SE model was 
introduced by Samuelson (1952) in a seminal paper, and was later popularised by Takayama 
and Judge in a series of papers (see e.g. Takayama and Judge, 1970, Takayama and Judge, 
1971, Takayama and Judge, 1964). It has since been widely used by economists for trade policy 
analyses (see e.g. Devadoss et al., 2005, Stennes and Wilson, 2005, Bennett and Yuan, 2017, 
Jiang et al., 2017, Boyd et al., 1993, Adams and Haynes, 1980, Shei and Thompson, 1977, 
Guajardo and Elizondo, 2003). Hieu and Harrison (2011) and Devadoss (2013) conduct theory 
and application reviews of SE models. As the name suggests, the SE model is a spatially 
explicit model, where nodes in space representing countries or markets are separated by 
distances characterised by trade flows. It assumes perfect competition, and resolves arbitrage 
in trade between nodes so that net profit is zero. 
As we are interested in examining the effects of trade costs in natural gas trade, we use the 
variant of the SE model specified in Takayama and Judge (1971) and Devadoss (2013) where 
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ad-valorem tariffs are explicitly considered. We model increased UK-EU natural gas trade 
costs as an implicit marginal increase in ad-valorem tariffs in trade between the two. It is 
important to note that in the status quo of IEM trade, explicit ad-valorem tariffs in natural gas 
trade between the UK and the EU is zero. This is unlikely to change in the post-Brexit market, 
given the relationship and mutual interests of the two. However, we assume that the potential 
increases in natural gas trade costs through the channels outlined in Section 1 would have the 
effect of an implicit non-zero ad-valorem tariff cost, hence our use of the mentioned variant of 
the SE model to capture the consequences of these cost effects for trade flows, prices and 
welfare. Specifically, consider n  countries, each of which has the following linear inverted 
supply and demand functions for natural gas; 
 Q   1,...,S Si i i ip i n       (1) 
 Q   1,...,D Di i i ip i n       (2) 
where i   is the set of countries; , ,    and    are function coefficients; SiQ  and 
D
iQ  are 
natural gas quantities supplied and demanded respectively; and Sip and 
D
ip are natural gas 
supply and demand prices respectively. Now consider ,i jX  and ,i jT  to be the trade flow 
quantity and the unit transportation cost of natural gas exported from country i  to country j  
respectively; ,i j to be the percentage increase in trade costs between country i  and country j
; and Si and 
D
i to be the market supply and demand prices of natural gas respectively. Given 
the above notations and definitions, the primal form of the variant of the SE model that we use, 
characterised as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP), is formulated as follows; 
 
,
1
  
n
S
i j i
j
X Q i

    (3) 
 
,
1
  
n
D
i j j
i
X Q j

    (4) 
 Q    S S Si i i i ip i        (5) 
 Q    D D Di i i i ip i        (6) 
   , ,1   ,S Di j i i j jT i j        (7) 
0,  0,  0,  0,  0D S D Si i ij i iQ Q X        
Equation (3) is an excess supply constraint which stipulates that a country may not export more 
than it produces. Equation (4) is an excess demand constraint which stipulates that demand in 
each country must be met by the imports from all other countries. Equation (5) is an optimal 
supply constraint which stipulates that a country’s supply price must be greater than or equal 
to the market supply price. Equation (6) is an optimal demand constraint which stipulates that 
a country’s demand price must be less than or equal to the market demand price. Here it is 
important to distinguish between country prices  p  and market prices   . For an interior 
solution at the optimum, the following conditions hold;  d di ip  , and 
s s
i ip   (Takayama and 
Judge, 1971, Devadoss et al., 2005). For corner solutions however, both prices may differ. 
Finally, equation (7) is a location equilibrium constraint which stipulates that the market supply 
price in export country i  plus transportation costs adjusted for the percentage increase in trade 
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costs ,i j  is greater than or equal to the market demand price in import country j . Quantities 
of demand, supply, trade flows and prices are non-negative. 
2.2 MODEL CALIBRATION 
Typically, the base solution in SE model (3)-(7) for trade flow variable ,i jX  does not exactly 
replicate the real-world observed trade flow data, which we notate as 
,
data
i jX . Over-
specialisation often occurs, wherefore the SE model base solution for trade flows variable ,i jX  
is restricted to a subset of the real world observed trade flows data 
,
data
i jX . The SE model 
therefore has to be calibrated for variable ,i jX  to exactly replicate the observed trade flows 
data 
,
data
i jX  before the imposition of policy scenarios. To achieve this calibration, we use the 
Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) approach (Howitt, 1995). This calibration 
approach is elegant in the sense that it helps achieve exact replication of the observed trade 
flows in the SE model without restraining the flexibility of the SE model itself (Heckelei, 
2002). There are two steps involved in PMP calibration. In the first step a tautological 
constraint is augmented to the SE model to force the trade flow variable ,i jX  to exactly 
replicate the observed real world trade flows data 
,
data
i jX  as follows; 
 
, ,
data
i j i jX X   (8) 
The above additional constraint helps uncover the effective or true unit transportation cost of 
trade between countries. Let ,i j  represent the dual variable of constraint equation (8). The 
differential of the Lagrangian function of SE model (3)-(8) with respect to trade flows variable 
,i jX results a condition that is then used to specify the effective unit transportation cost ,
ˆ
i jT  of 
trade between countries as follows; 
 , , ,
ˆ
i j i j i jT T     (9) 
In the second step of the PMP calibration procedure, the effective unit transportation cost ,
ˆ
i jT  
is used instead of  the nominal unit transportation cost ,i jT  to solve SE model (3)-(7) (i.e. this 
time without the calibration constraint equation (8)). As the effective transportation cost ,
ˆ
i jT  
reflects the true unit marginal cost of transportation from exporting country i  to importing 
country j , exact replication of the observed trade flows data 
,
data
i jX  is achieved as the base 
solution for trade flow variable ,i jX . Once calibration is achieved, the SE model is used to 
simulate policy scenarios. 
2.3 MODEL SOLUTION 
Rutherford (2002) find that economic equilibrium models such as the SE model are more 
efficiently solved as MCPs. This advises our choice of the MCP formulation above, rather than 
the alternative non-linear programming (NLP) approach. The model is implemented in the 
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General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software using the PATH solver. To simulate 
the effects of increased trade costs on trade flows, prices and welfare, we bi-directionally and 
equally adjust the parameter ,i j  upwards for trade between the UK and the EU only (i.e. 
,UK EU  = ,EU UK ). Producer and consumer surpluses (i.e. welfare) are calculated post-
policy simulations as follows; 
    , , , ,0.5 S S S Si i final i initial i final i initialps Q Q p p       (10) 
    , , , ,0.5 D D D Di i final i initial i initial i finalcs Q Q p p       (11) 
where ips  and ics  are respectively the producer and consumer surpluses of country i ; initial 
quantities and prices reflect the base data whilst final quantities and prices reflect post 
simulation predictions. We impose additional constraints in the model to reflect the reality of 
global gas trade. In particular, we constrain the model from decreasing pipeline gas trade by 
more than 50%. This reflects the unlikelihood of pipelined trade links being severed completely 
as the infrastructure is cheaper and convenient, and would typically have been established 
through long term trade and transport contracts between parties so that the lumpy investment 
costs would be recovered. We also constrain smaller exporting countries from increasing 
existing export flows by more than 20% as these countries would likely not have the pre-
existing infrastructure to achieve significantly increased exports in the short to medium term. 
3 DATA 
We use data from a series of sources to specify our global SE model. Our primary source of 
natural gas trade, consumption and production data is the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy (2017). Where trade data from this source is unavailable, we augment with data from 
other sources such as the UN Comtrade (2018) and the ITC Trademap (2018). The extract of 
data that we use is summarised in Table 1, Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
Table 1 shows the maximum annual gas trade flows between relevant countries and regions 
over the last decade of the data (i.e. 2007 – 2017). As ours is a static SE model, use of annual 
trade for a single year conceals the historical trade flows between countries and regions. For 
example, as shown in Figure 1a, total EU26 exports to the UK in 2017 is much lower than the 
historical trend suggests. Use of maximum annual gas trade flows over the last decade of the 
data as the basis of our base trade data for static SE modelling affords a better sense of the 
historical trade links that have existed between countries and regions in the recent past. Table 
1 shows that the UK has exported a maximum annual amount of about 8,269 kilotonnes of 
natural gas to the EU26 over the last decade of data. This is more than it has exported to any 
other world country or region. Although an EU member country, we separately present the 
Republic of Ireland as a special case because of its high dependency on UK imports. In addition 
to exports to the EU26, the UK has exported a maximum annual amount of about 3,855 
kilotonnes of natural gas to the Republic of Ireland, further highlighting the importance of the 
EU market for UK natural gas exports. These maximal UK exports occurred in 2009 and 2011 
for the EU26 and the Republic of Ireland respectively, as shown in Figure 1a. 
In the same time period, Table 1 shows that the EU26 have exported a maximum annual amount 
of about 7,764 kilotonnes of natural gas to the UK, with this flow occurring in 2013 as shown 
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in Figure 1a. This is equivalent to the EU26’s second highest exports to any other world region, 
with its exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) only marginally higher.  
The UK however imports significantly more natural gas from non-EU Europe and the Middle 
East, with a maximum annual amount of about 26,235 kilotonnes and 15,983 kilotonnes (in 
2017 and 2011) respectively from both regions.  Similarly, the EU imports significantly more 
natural gas from other world regions such as the CIS (about 125,208 kilotonnes in 2017), non-
EU Europe (about 68,512 kilotonnes in 2012) and Northern Africa (about 48,576 kilotonnes in 
2008). 
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Table 1: Maximum annual natural gas trade in the period 2007 – 2017 for the UK, the EU, the Republic of Ireland and major world regions (kilotonnes). All countries 
included 
From 
To 
Asia Pacific CIS Caribbean EU26 Other Europe Ireland Middle East North America Northern Africa South America Southern Africa UK Western Africa 
Asia Pacific    135,376.41   ♦   ♦   ♦   ♦   ♦         1,106.31               1,443.04                     404.32                   130.33   ♦             54.75   
CIS      40,634.50     76,037.10   ♦     125,208.65     31,047.27   ♦         9,153.43   ♦   ♦   ♦   ♦       3,280.90   
Caribbean        2,621.50       1,995.88         4,279.09           301.05             901.99             10,335.36                     385.54               6,002.76        1,453.05   
EU26        3,155.42     10,671.48            92.27       57,021.37       2,085.61   ♦            743.98                   249.94                     658.20               1,781.39   ♦       7,764.82                        4.53  
Eastern Africa  ♦   ♦    ♦   ♦   ♦   ♦   ♦   ♦   ♦                 3,149.76   ♦   
Other Europe            378.52   ♦   ♦       68,512.26       1,179.99   ♦            183.03                   718.38                     209.89                   691.52   ♦     26,235.20   
Ireland             ♦   
Middle Africa        4,322.79             67.91             469.61           210.21          1,648.87                   386.22                     207.68               1,033.95    ♦   
Middle East      76,481.44       1,623.09         201.31       15,528.81       8,331.92   ♦      18,335.53               5,748.80                 4,978.06               1,590.84   ♦     15,983.10   
North America        5,242.27   ♦         175.79         1,374.57           491.31   ♦         1,382.55          120,624.29                     134.04               1,157.63   ♦           104.67   
Northern Africa        5,731.57   ♦   ♦       48,576.32       3,499.19   ♦         4,540.39               4,897.32                 3,545.35                   461.89   ♦       1,698.89   
South America        1,528.81   ♦              1.35         2,837.09   ♦   ♦                 5.44               3,142.28   ♦             14,322.21   ♦             99.19   ♦  
Southern Africa              39.91              
UK              74.67   ♦            29.43         8,269.32           137.54     3,855.73            133.66   ♦                       67.63                   116.02   ♦    
Western Africa      10,364.70           181.79       11,211.61       1,579.10           2,227.53               2,665.76                 1,060.87               2,262.77             865.32                   641.13  
♦ Less than 0.01 kilotonnes 
*BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2007 – 2017)  
*EU26 excludes the UK and the Republic of Ireland 
*Based on a conversion factor of 1 kilo tonne = 1.294585*10-3 Bcm for all countries
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Despite the significant levels of natural gas trade between the UK and the EU however, 
historical trade between them as a proportion of their consumption levels is small. Figure1.b 
shows the EU26, UK and the Republic of Ireland consumption levels and trend over the last 
decade of the data. Figure 2.a shows that the UK’s exports to the EU26 only forms a small 
proportion (about 2.21%) of the EU26’s total consumption. Similarly, the EU26’s exports to 
the UK only form a small proportion (about 8.63%) of the UK’s total consumption. The 
Republic of Ireland however, an EU member country, is significantly dependent on UK natural 
gas imports for its consumption. Figure 2.b shows trade as a proportion of their production 
levels. Notice that UK exports to the EU as a proportion of its production was lowest in 2013 
when the UK experienced extreme winter conditions. This lends credence to the allusion in this 
paper that a likely consequence of Brexit is that implicit trade restrictions are realised in 
emergency or high demand periods as both parties bolter own-supplies to meet own-demand, 
leading to higher natural gas costs.
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FIGURE 1: TRADE AND CONSUMPTION 
  
A: Total annual natural gas exports between the UK, the EU26 and the Republic of Ireland B: Total annual natural gas consumption in the UK, the EU26 and the Republic of Ireland 
*BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2017) 
*EU26 excludes the UK and the Republic of Ireland 
*Based on a conversion factor of 1 kilo tonne = 1.294585*10-3 Bcm for all countries 
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FIGURE 2: TRADE AS A PROPORTION OF CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION  
  
A: Trade as a proportion of consumption in the UK, the Republic of Ireland and the 
EU26 
B: Trade as a proportion of production in the UK and the EU26 (The Republic of 
Ireland production is small, hence not shown in the figure) 
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We require price and elasticity estimates to derive the inverted linear supply and demand 
functions for each country. Using UN Comtrade (2018) and ITC Trademap (2018) data, we are 
able to construct a country’s cost-insurance-freight (CIF) import price and the free-on-board 
(FOB) export price of natural gas as the ratio of the total value of trade ($) to the total weight 
of trade (tonnes) (hence $/tonne). Where price data is unavailable for a country, we use the 
regional price average. We use the CIF import prices as proxy for natural gas demand price; 
and use the FOB export prices as proxy for natural gas supply price. A number of studies have 
estimated the own-price elasticities of natural gas and similar primary energy fuels such as 
crude oil (see e.g. Krichene, 2002, Burke and Yang, 2016, Brenton, 1997, Asche et al., 2008, 
Dilaver et al., 2014, Caldara et al., 2018). We assume the own-price elasticity of natural gas to 
be -0.14, and own-price elasticity of supply to be 0.10. These are within the reported ranges in 
the literature for natural gas and similar primary energy fuels. With the natural gas supply and 
demand prices as well as price elasticities determined, we are able to specify the parameters of 
the inverted linear supply and demand functions for each country. 
Following Devadoss et al. (2005), we use the constructed CIF import prices and the FOB export 
prices of selected countries to calculate the transport cost of natural gas trade between all 
countries. Specifically, the unit transportation cost (in $/tonne) is calculated as the difference 
between the CIF import price and FOB export price of natural gas trade between the selected 
countries. This figure is then divided by the trade distance between the selected countries to 
get the unit transportation cost (in $/tonne.km), which is then assumed to be the same for trade 
between all countries. We use bilateral trade distance estimates provided by Mayer and 
Zignago (2011). For any two trading countries, these distances are estimated to account for 
closeness of trade ties, difficulty of access to markets, border effects, language effects, as well 
as the significance of the different modes of transport involved in trade (e.g. shipping, trucking, 
rail, etc.).   
Finally, we need data on the prevailing ad-valorem tariff levels for natural gas trade between 
countries. The WTO’s Tariff Analysis Online facility (WTO Tariff Online Facility, 2017) 
provides a comprehensive database of the ad-valorem tariffs on natural gas trade between 
countries. A number of ad-valorem tariff classifications determine the specific tariff level 
realised in trade between countries. For example, natural gas exporting countries that are 
members of the WTO realise the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rate set by an importing 
WTO member country. On the other hand, some WTO member countries may have Preferential 
Trade Agreements (PTA) with lower tariffs agreed bilaterally, in which case the MFN tariff 
rate is over-ridden in favour of PTA tariffs. We use the applicable tariff rate for trade between 
countries as the basis for specifying our SE model. As mentioned earlier, UK-EU explicit tariff 
levels for natural gas trade are currently zero and this is unlikely to change in the post-Brexit 
market. However, we assume that increased UK-EU trade costs through the channels 
mentioned in Section 1 will have the effect of an implicit marginal ad-valorem tariff, which 
enables use of the SE model to examine the potential implications of this effect. 
In our final dataset, only countries for which we have the complete and satisfactory information 
for all parameters (i.e. prices, trade distances, elasticities of supply and demand, existing 
tariffs), and for which the linear supply and demand functions are well defined and scaled are 
considered. Our final dataset for modelling consists of 93 countries involved in global natural 
gas trade. The regional classifications of the individual countries as well as their associations 
with relevant trade organisations are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
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4 RESULTS 
The matrix of results from the 93 natural gas trading countries used in our SE model is too 
large to fully present in the paper. In the interest of space therefore, only select results are 
presented. In particular, we present results for increased trade costs of up to 5%, which expert 
opinion assumes is likely to be realised for the reasons mentioned in our introduction; and 10% 
which is the likely realisable maximum. Full and further results are available upon request.  
4.1 TRADE FLOW EFFECTS DUE TO INCREASED COST OF TRADE 
Focusing on UK trade changes, Figure 3 shows a summary of the import and export trade 
changes with individual countries. The most significant change is the UK’s resort to greater 
internal trade (i.e. a 10% increase in UK-UK trade) and its decrease in exports to the EU. The 
large increase in the UK’s reliance on internal trade causes decreases in UK imports from the 
EU and other parts of the world, including Russia, Qatar and Algeria. As the UK-EU26 and 
the UK-Ireland trade are via pipeline, the decrease in trade from both directions would imply 
a significant underutilisation of the existing UK-EU pipeline capacity. This may also have 
negative implications for the economic feasibility of planned future expansions in pipeline 
connections for trade between both parties.  
For the EU26, Figure 4 shows that there are increases in internal trade via the Netherlands and 
Germany; increased imports from other parts of the world including Qatar, Norway and 
Algeria; and decreased imports from in particular the UK, Russia and Egypt. Unlike the UK 
however, the EU26 increases exports to some countries including Argentina, Brazil and India. 
There is also increase in trade with the Republic of Ireland. Regarding the EU26’s trade with 
the UK, the large decrease in EU26 imports and exports reflects the vulnerability of the existing 
trade to cost increases, and hence the importance of the IEM in keeping these costs down 
through inherent trading efficiencies. 
For the Republic of Ireland, its large dependence on UK imports mean an increase in UK-EU 
trade costs causes a fundamental shift in its natural gas sourcing portfolio. Figure 5 shows that 
its imports from the UK decreases by half, with the remaining demand imported via new trade 
links with the EU (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands) and the rest of the world (e.g. US, Russia, 
Qatar, Norway and Algeria). As direct pipelines do not exist for trade between Ireland and 
these countries, these new trade links would imply a shift from gaseous gas via pipelines to 
LNG via shipping. A further implication also is that the Republic of Ireland would have to 
invest in infrastructure (e.g. regasification facilities) in the short to medium term to receive 
LNG gas imports from the EU and the rest of the world. Also, the decrease in the UK-Ireland 
trade link would have negative economic feasibility implications for planned pipeline 
expansions in the Irish Sea to facilitate trade between the two.
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FIGURE 3: CHANGES IN UK IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AS A RESULT OF A 5% AND 10% INCREASE IN THE COST OF NATURAL GAS TRADE BETWEEN THE UK AND 
THE EU (KILOTONNES) 
  
A. Changes in UK imports, kilotonnes B. Changes in UK exports, kilotonnes 
-5,000 0 5,000 10,000
Yemen
US
UK
Trinidad & Tobago
Russia
Qatar
Peru
Nigeria
Netherlands
Germany
Egypt
Belgium
Australia
Algeria
5% increase 10% increase
-5,000 0 5,000 10,000
UK
UAE
Turkey
South Korea
Pakistan
Norway
Netherlands
Italy
Ireland
India
Germany
France
Egypt
Brazil
Belgium
Argentina
5% increase 10% increase
16 
 
FIGURE 4: CHANGES IN EU26 IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AS A RESULT OF A 5% AND 10% INCREASE IN COST OF TRADE BETWEEN THE UK AND 
THE EU (KILOTONNES) 
  
A. Changes in EU26 imports, kilotonnes B. Changes in EU26 exports, kilotonnes 
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FIGURE 5: CHANGES IN IRELAND IMPORTS AS A RESULT OF A 5% AND 10% INCREASE IN 
COST OF TRADE BETWEEN THE UK AND THE EU (KILOTONNES) 
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4.2 PRICES AND WELFARE 
Figure 6 shows the loss in consumer and producer surpluses in the UK and the EU due to 
increased trade costs between the two. Price changes are less than 1% in all cases. The 
consumer surplus effect of the price changes are however significant. For the UK, loss in 
consumer surplus is in the order of $46million and $55million for 5% and 10% cost increases 
respectively. For Germany, loss in consumer surplus is in the order of $51million and 
$65million for 5% and 10% increased costs respectively. For the entire EU27, loss in consumer 
surplus is in the order of $272million and $321million for 5% and 10% cost increases 
respectively. Loss in producer surplus in the UK is in the order of $433million for a 5% and 
10% cost increases. The high UK loss in producer surplus is expected, given that more than 
99% of the UK’s annual natural gas export is to the EU market. In the EU27, loss in producer 
surplus is in the order of $330million and $635million for 5% and 10% cost increases 
respectively. The loss in producer surpluses arise from the increased internal trade in the UK 
and the EU. The increased internal trade is inefficient, given that comparative advantage could 
be gained through trade at lower cost. The large relative loss of producer surplus in the UK 
reflects the loss in the advantage of the status quo, where over 99% of its annual natural gas 
exports are to the EU market.  
At 5% cost increase, which we assume is the likely rate, the total welfare loss (i.e. loss in 
consumer and producer surpluses) for the UK and the EU are $479million and $602million 
respectively. Although the absolute welfare loss for the UK is less, the loss as a proportion of 
absolute value of natural gas trade is significantly higher for the UK than it is for the EU. For 
example, total natural gas trade for the UK and the EU in 2017 is about $12.99billion and 
$102.91billion respectively (UN Comtrade, 2018). Hence total welfare loss for the UK and the 
EU is about 3.69% and 0.59% of their respective total values of trade. For both parties also, 
there is differentiation in the share of the losses for producers and consumers. As a proportion 
of the total welfare loss, producers’ share of the loss in the UK is larger than consumers’ share. 
The opposite is true for the EU. This would imply that the burden of the welfare losses would 
be disproportionately borne by UK producers than it would be for EU producers. This has 
significant implications for the post-Brexit UK natural gas industry. 
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FIGURE 6: WELFARE CHANGES IN THE UK AND THE EU DUE TO INCREASED TRADE COSTS 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Natural gas is an important global primary energy commodity. The UK and the EU engage in 
significant natural gas trade. As the UK exits from the EU however, it is also likely to exit from 
the EU Internal Energy Market (IEM). The IEM is the EU institution established to regulate 
and maintain natural gas (and electricity) trade between EU member countries, with the goal 
to reduce trading barriers, enhance trade efficiency and reduce trade costs. With the UK’s exit 
from the IEM, trading costs between the UK and the EU27 are likely to increase due to  (1) 
loss in trade efficiency arising from loss of EU financing previously aimed at improving 
efficiencies in trade between the two; (2) loss in trade efficiency arising from loss in the 
sophistication of financial instruments that are linked to the UK’s membership of the EU and 
the IEM; (3) energy security cost effects arising from the significant exposure of the Republic 
of Ireland (an EU member country) to UK gas imports; and (4) rising costs of doing business 
in the UK for many EU energy companies due to the effects of possible regulatory divergence 
between the UK and the EU; etc. We use a spatial equilibrium model to examine the trade flow, 
price and welfare implications of these cost effects on global natural gas trade, with a focus on 
the UK and the EU. The SE model assumes perfect competition and resolves arbitrage in trade 
between countries. 
We find that cost increases in the UK-EU natural gas trade would result a significant re-
alignment of UK natural gas trade, with an increased focus on internal trade. This would lead 
to significant welfare losses (overall welfare loss is $479million which is about 3.69% of UK 
trade value in 2017), with the producer welfare loss being significantly higher than consumer 
welfare loss. The high UK loss in producer surpluses is expected, given that more than 99% of 
the UK’s annual natural gas exports are to the EU market. For the EU also, this would result 
significant trade changes. Internal trade would increase although to a lesser extent, whilst 
external trade through imports and exports are reconfigured. For the Republic of Ireland in 
particular, UK imports which it hitherto depended on heavily would be cut significantly. 
Remaining Irish demand would be sourced through new trade links with other countries, where 
the gas is imported via LNG rather than pipeline via the UK. Overall the EU27 would suffer 
high welfare losses too (overall loss is $602million which is about 0.59% of EU trade value in 
2017), with the consumer welfare loss being significantly greater than producer welfare loss. 
The results show differentiation in the share of the welfare losses borne by consumers and 
producers in the UK and the EU, with greater imbalance in the UK where producers bear the 
greater share. 
The overall decrease in UK and EU trade would result significant underutilisation of the 
existing pipeline links connecting the two, and would have negative economic feasibility 
implications for planned investments in future pipeline links. For the Republic of Ireland, the 
decreased UK trade would mean a shift from pipeline to LNG trade. This would have 
implications for short to medium term investments in regasification facilities and related 
infrastructure in order to allow for the shift to LNG trade. 
In conclusion, our results give an indication of the likely trade, price and welfare implications 
of potential increases in costs in natural gas trade between the UK and the EU, as the UK exits 
the EU and the IEM. It is worth mentioning some limitations of our results however. In 
particular, the SE model used assumes perfect competition. Some research suggests that 
markets for primary energy products such as natural gas and oil may not be perfect. Also we 
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have assumed feasible trade between all countries. There may be geopolitical reasons why trade 
within and between some countries and regions may not be feasible. These considerations have 
not been factored into our analysis. Further research may be needed to determine the possible 
post-Brexit implications of these considerations on UK-EU natural gas trade. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Final set of 93 countries in our data, their sub-regional placements and associations with relevant 
organisations 
Sub-Region Country 
Associations 
EU WTO OECD OPEC 
Asia Pacific Australia No Yes Yes No 
Asia Pacific Brunei No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific China No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific India No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific Indonesia No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific Japan No Yes Yes No 
Asia Pacific Malaysia No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific Myanmar No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific Pakistan No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific Papua New Guinea No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific Singapore No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific South Korea No No Yes No 
Asia Pacific Taiwan No Yes No No 
Asia Pacific Thailand No Yes No No 
CIS Armenia No Yes No No 
CIS Azerbaijan No No No No 
CIS Belarus No No No No 
CIS Kazakhstan No Yes No No 
CIS Kyrgyzstan No Yes No No 
CIS Moldova No Yes No No 
CIS Russia No Yes No No 
CIS Tajikistan No Yes No No 
CIS Turkmenistan No No No No 
CIS Ukraine No Yes No No 
CIS Uzbekistan No No No No 
Caribbean Barbados No Yes No No 
Caribbean Dominican Republic No Yes No No 
Caribbean Jamaica No Yes No No 
Caribbean Trinidad & Tobago No Yes No No 
EU26 Austria Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Belgium Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Bulgaria Yes Yes No No 
EU26 Croatia Yes Yes No No 
EU26 Czech Republic Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Denmark Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Estonia Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Finland Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 France Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Germany Yes Yes Yes No 
  
Sub-Region Country 
Associations 
EU WTO OECD OPEC 
EU26 Greece Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Hungary Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Italy Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Latvia Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Lithuania Yes Yes No No 
EU26 Luxembourg Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Malta Yes Yes No No 
EU26 Netherlands Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Poland Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Portugal Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Romania Yes Yes No No 
EU26 Slovakia Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Slovenia Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Spain Yes Yes Yes No 
EU26 Sweden Yes Yes Yes No 
Eastern Africa Mozambique No Yes No No 
Ireland Ireland Yes Yes Yes No 
Middle Africa Angola No Yes No Yes 
Middle Africa Equatorial Guinea No No No Yes 
Middle East Iran No No No Yes 
Middle East Iraq No No No Yes 
Middle East Israel No Yes Yes No 
Middle East Jordan No Yes No No 
Middle East Kuwait No Yes No Yes 
Middle East Oman No Yes No No 
Middle East Qatar No Yes No Yes 
Middle East UAE No Yes No Yes 
Middle East Yemen No Yes No No 
North America Canada No Yes Yes No 
North America Mexico No Yes Yes No 
North America US No Yes Yes No 
Northern Africa Algeria No No No Yes 
Northern Africa Egypt No Yes No No 
Northern Africa Libya No No No Yes 
Northern Africa Morocco No Yes No No 
Northern Africa Tunisia No Yes No No 
Other Europe Georgia No Yes No No 
Other Europe Macedonia No Yes No No 
Other Europe Norway No Yes Yes No 
Other Europe Serbia No No No No 
Other Europe Switzerland No Yes Yes No 
Other Europe Turkey No Yes Yes No 
South America Argentina No Yes No No 
South America Bolivia No Yes No No 
  
Sub-Region Country 
Associations 
EU WTO OECD OPEC 
South America Brazil No Yes No No 
South America Chile No Yes Yes No 
South America Colombia No Yes No No 
South America Peru No Yes No No 
South America Uruguay No Yes No No 
South America Venezuela No Yes No Yes 
Southern Africa South Africa No Yes No No 
UK UK Yes Yes Yes No 
Western Africa Ghana No Yes No No 
Western Africa Nigeria No Yes No Yes 
*CIS is Commonwealth of Independent States 
 
